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ABSTRACT
This article engages critically with recent literature on political settle-
ments through a case study of inter-ethnic conflict in southern 
Kyrgyzstan. The case study traces how a new political settlement 
emerged in the aftermath of conflict, despite a rejection of international 
proposals on conflict resolution. Instead, local elites constructed an 
exclusionary form of social order, forged through dispossession and 
violence, maintained by informal institutions of patronage and client-
age. The article explains why this new political settlement appeared 
remarkably resilient, despite its failure to address traditional liberal 
concerns regarding transitional justice and minority grievances. The 
case study highlights two major problems with the political settlements 
literature. First, it contests a widespread conceptualisation of political 
settlements as indicating a cessation of conflict, instead pointing to 
how a political settlement can be initiated and maintained through 
different forms of violence. Second, it questions notions of inclusivity 
in political settlements, noting that many political settlements combine 
logics of both inclusion and exclusion. In many cases, they are marked 
by exclusionary, authoritarian practices that together constitute a form 
of ‘illiberal peace’. These findings caution against a simplistic use of polit-
ical settlements theory to inform policies aimed at resolving internal 
conflicts.
Introduction
In contrast to the expectations of liberal peacebuilders, most post-conflict political orders 
in the late twentieth and early twenty-first century have been marked by a pattern of clien-
telistic order-building, in which the coercive redistribution of property has played a promi-
nent role.1 These outcomes pose a significant challenge to theories of liberal peacebuilding, 
which assumed that political and economic liberalisation, combined with ‘good governance’, 
would prove successful in achieving sustainable peace after conflict. Recent research on 
political settlements and on ‘illiberal’ or ‘authoritarian’ modes of conflict management offers 
new theoretical insights into why post-conflict regimes have often rejected liberal peace-
building prescriptions and instead relied on hierarchical and exclusionary political and 
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economic structures to produce relatively stable forms of political order.2 We apply these 
theoretical approaches in a detailed case study of inter-ethnic conflict in the post-Soviet 
state of Kyrgyzstan to explain how political settlements may be renegotiated through vio-
lence and exclusion.
The article proceeds as follows. First, we engage with the literature on political settle-
ments, particularly the work of Mushtaq Khan. We develop this research in a new direction, 
by linking it to an emerging literature on authoritarian forms of post-conflict order, notably 
the model of authoritarian conflict management developed by Lewis, Heathershaw and 
Megoran.3 We then test the relevance of these theoretical frameworks through an analysis 
of conflict and post-conflict settlement in southern Kyrgyzstan, where inter-ethnic violence 
broke out in the city of Osh in June 2010 between Kyrgyz and Uzbek communities, leading 
to hundreds of deaths and the destruction of some 2000 homes. In our study we attempt 
to explain why an existing political settlement broke down, and how a new one was forged 
through a process of violent conflict and the renegotiation of informal institutions. This 
post-conflict order was not accompanied by an explicit ‘elite bargain’ or a formal peace 
process. There was no attempt to address underlying historical grievances or to engage in 
a public process of transitional justice. Instead, a new political settlement in southern 
Kyrgyzstan was achieved primarily through the renegotiation of informal institutions in the 
political economy, in ways which were ultimately accepted as broadly legitimate – and there-
fore sustainable – by key elites in different communities, despite their being forged through 
violence and exclusion.
Studying informal institutions is complex because they are not recorded in written doc-
uments and codified procedures. Our research in Kyrgyzstan builds on the tradition of polit-
ical ethnography explored by Schatz, Wedeen and others as an appropriate method to 
understand both the functioning and the meaning of informal political institutions.4 Not 
only does ethnography provide a way to understand how informal systems work, but it also 
provides insight into how different communities interpret these practices. Schatz argues 
that an ethnographic approach represents a certain ‘sensibility’, ‘an approach that cares to 
glean the meanings that the people under study attribute to their social and political reality’.5 
In Kyrgyzstan, local meanings of concepts such as peace, conflict, sovereignty and justice 
often diverge markedly from the categories used by outsiders.6 Similarly, informal and formal 
practices in business and trade are not viewed as simply economic transactions based on 
cost–benefit analysis, but as socially embedded institutions informed by a deeper web of 
meanings and beliefs derived from historical and social experience.7
The raw data for our study comprised more than 50 interviews with local businesspeople, 
political leaders, activists, security officials and representatives of local NGOs and interna-
tional organisations, gathered through a series of visits to Kyrgyzstan over three years in 
2012–2015. These interviews aimed to understand the discourse and practices of local elites 
who had a role in the post-conflict settlement in Kyrgyzstan. Since the potential for political 
bias is high in contested political environments, oral interviews were verified by comparing 
the accounts of representatives of different social groups and communities, and where pos-
sible triangulated with reference to public written sources, including academic research, 
public inquiries, government reports, etc. The credibility of interviews was also assessed 
longitudinally, since the authors had long periods of residence and research in Osh city at 
other times during 2000–2015, and contact with interviewees was in some cases maintained 
over a long period of time. Interviews were largely unstructured and often took place in 
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social or informal settings; in many cases, they comprised multiple interviews, conversations 
and other social interactions in different settings in Osh, Bishkek and other locations over 
several visits. Interviews were conducted in Russian, Kyrgyz and English. Since much of the 
information was sensitive, the interviews were all anonymised to protect the security of 
interviewees. Where relevant we also used official statements, international reports, media 
reports and – where possible – official statistics and data, although in many cases these were 
not accessible or were considered unreliable. In particular, information on the ethnic break-
down of business ownership, the extent of property transfers during the conflict period, and 
the extent and significance of informal institutions in the economy are all difficult to verify, 
and largely depend on careful assessment and triangulation of non-official sources.
Political settlements and conflict
An emerging literature concludes that many externally-brokered peace processes have failed 
because they did not take account of the underlying ‘political settlement’, the basic distri-
bution of political and economic power in a society. Political settlements theory argues that 
‘violent conflict stabilises only when the allocation of benefits, opportunities and resources 
(such as political positions or business prospects) is consistent with how power is distributed 
in society’.8 These findings have been influential in a new policy literature, which argues that 
excluding powerful elites from any peace process reduces the likelihood of a sustainable 
peace; consequently, external actors should support more inclusive political settlements.9 
As we demonstrate in our case study, the redistribution of property and business between 
different communities is central to understanding why violence breaks out and why it even-
tually abates.
These policy-oriented accounts of political settlement are heavily indebted to the aca-
demic work of the economist Mushtaq Khan.10 Khan defines a political settlement as ‘a com-
bination of power and institutions that is mutually compatible and also sustainable in terms 
of economic and political viability’.11 If the underlying power distribution is not adequately 
reflected in institutional structures, particularly those that govern the distribution of eco-
nomic benefits, powerful groups will try to change the system, if necessary through violence. 
Conflicts are likely to break out ‘when competing organizations do not accept a distribution 
of benefits as reflecting their true relative power’. According to Khan, ‘a political settlement 
emerges when the distribution of benefits supported by its institutions is consistent with 
the distribution of power in society, and the economic and political outcomes of these 
institutions are sustainable over time’.12
In Khan’s model, conflicts act as ‘a mechanism for establishing both a shared understand-
ing of relative power and a distribution of benefits that is in line with this distribution of 
holding power’.13 In other words, violent conflicts are a grim reckoning of accounts between 
rivals, a test of what Khan terms ‘holding power’, defined as ‘the ability of a particular orga-
nization to hold out in actual or potential conflicts against other organizations, including 
the enforcement organizations of the state’. Although ‘holding power’ has economic and 
coercive aspects, it also reflects non-material capacities, such as the capacity to mobilise 
supporters through ideology.14 Since holding power is difficult to measure objectively and 
depends also on public perceptions, conflicts act as a mechanism to assess whether such 
perceptions are correct, to rebalance the distribution of resources and potentially to 
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institute a new political settlement. Either ‘institutions … adapt to the distribution of power, 
or conflicts can continue till a new distribution of power emerges’.15 Ending conflict there-
fore requires not only new formal rules of the game, but a renegotiation of informal insti-
tutions, which act as the primary mechanism for distributing resources in developing 
economies.
Our study emphasises three additional points which are either disputed or overlooked 
in the current political settlements debate. First, one strand in the policy-oriented literature 
tends to conflate political settlements with inclusive ‘elite bargains’, defining a political set-
tlement as a ‘conflict-ending agreement among powerful groups’.16 But political settlements 
and elite bargains are distinct concepts. As Khan argues, the concept of political settlement 
is more analytically useful when it references underlying distributions of organisational 
power that achieve some measure of sustainability.17 Political settlements may not end all 
forms of violent conflict. In a study of political settlement in the Niger Delta, Schultze‐Kraft 
demonstrates how organised violence and organised criminal activities are integral to certain 
aspects of the political settlement.18 In the Democratic Republic of the Congo (DRC), Perera 
finds that an ‘inclusive’ but violent settlement has created a system in which elites have 
significant incentives to continue to perpetuate violence.19 A political settlement – as we 
find in our own study – may be forged through the violent redistribution of property, and 
imposed and maintained through coercion and exclusion. Political settlements should not 
be understood as merely a new incarnation of liberal models of inclusive peacebuilding, but 
represent a much more normatively challenging model, in which political order is often 
constructed through coercive practices and structural violence.
Second, although rent-sharing mechanisms are an important part of most political set-
tlements, these are not simple economic exchanges to ‘buy peace’, but embedded cultural 
processes, which have meaning for participants beyond simple financial transactions. Khan 
argues that ‘all developing countries have variants of “clientelist” political settlements’, 
defined as those in which ‘significant holding power is based on sources outside the incomes 
generated by formal institutions’.20 These informal institutions provide mechanisms to sup-
port elite bargains based on rent-sharing agreements, which can stabilise violent conflict 
by persuading armed factions to participate in a stable political coalition.21 Such arrange-
ments can lay the basis for what North terms a ‘limited access order’, a rent-sharing agreement 
that achieves some measure of sustainable political order.22 In most cases, informal institu-
tions go beyond simple forms of rent-sharing; they are also embedded in existing systems 
of social relations and cultural practices, and are shaped by a set of ‘semiotic practices’, in 
which the meanings ascribed to everyday economic transactions have profound importance 
for their perceived legitimacy in society.23 In short, economic models of political order based 
on rent-seeking behaviour need to be complemented by an interpretive account of how 
such mechanisms are understood and legitimised in local communities.
Third, the political settlement literature emphasises the importance of inclusivity – the 
incorporation of diverse elite groups in political processes – but in reality, political settle-
ments are characterised by logics of both inclusion and exclusion. They often result in a 
hierarchical, authoritarian form of political settlement, achieved through the repression and 
dispossession of rival elites. Many conflict-affected societies are characterised by what Khan 
terms ‘competitive clientelism’, implying a constant process of negotiation among different 
groups over mutual ‘holding power’, i.e. over the terms and conditions of the political set-
tlement.24 Since the analysis of holding power is always uncertain, such systems are often 
THIRD WORLD QUARTERLY 5
marked by frequent attempts to test the power of opponents through small-scale unrest, 
riots, election violence or other forms of contested politics. To avoid the constant risk of 
conflict associated with competitive clientelism, post-conflict governments often attempt 
to impose an authoritarian system, resulting in what recent literature has termed ‘authori-
tarian’ or ‘illiberal’ modes of conflict management, observed in a range of recent conflicts, 
such as Chechnya, Sri Lanka or Syria.25 In one model Lewis, Heathershaw and Megoran 
conceptualise this as ‘authoritarian conflict management’, a set of practices ranged across 
the domains of discourse, space and political economy. Such an authoritarian post-conflict 
order aims to construct a ‘single-patron’ rather than a ‘multiple-patron’ order in the political 
economy, forming a monolithic pyramid that fuses political and economic power and avoids 
the conflictual nature of ‘competitive clientelism’.26 The result is a hierarchical, illiberal ‘peace’, 
in which the violent redistribution of economic resources during a conflict contributes to 
the emergence of a new political settlement marked by the institutionalisation of new power 
realities within authoritarian political structures.27
The breakdown of political settlement in Kyrgyzstan
Post-Soviet Kyrgyzstan provides a clear case study of how informal political settlements can 
be undermined by shifts in holding power between two groups, and how they may be 
reconstructed in the aftermath of conflict through both informal institutions in the political 
economy and patterns of violence and coercion. A focus on the south of Kyrgyzstan high-
lights the importance of sub-national conflict dynamics, seeking to address a concern that 
research on political settlements primarily focuses on national-level conflict dynamics and 
settlements.28 The Osh region of southern Kyrgyzstan was severely affected by the tensions 
and fractures stemming from post-Soviet economic collapse, the influence of radical Islamist 
groups and competitive state-building projects in Uzbekistan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan, 
which created serious border tensions and divided societies in the Fergana valley, where 
the three states meet. In June 1990, some 300 people died in fighting between the majority 
Kyrgyz and the minority Uzbek community in the region of Osh. The conflict was sparked 
by demographic shifts and disputes over land and other economic resources, as ethnic 
Kyrgyz began to move in greater numbers into Osh and other towns, which had been tra-
ditionally dominated by ethnic Uzbeks and Russian-speaking groups.29 KGB reports after 
the 1990 violence pointed to multiple causes, including ‘a perception among poorer ethnic 
Kyrgyz that Uzbeks were becoming more prosperous […] and controlling the markets’.30
The perceived economic prosperity of the Uzbek community was often exaggerated – 
many Uzbek residents were just as poor as their Kyrgyz neighbours – but many of the leading 
businesspeople in the city came from the Uzbek community.31 Uzbek entrepreneurs domi-
nated some key sectors of the economy, particularly service sector businesses and crafts 
such as catering, hospitality, retail, transport and cross-border trade, although even before 
2010 Kyrgyz entrepreneurs were increasingly active in a growing number of economic 
sectors.
This economic influence of Uzbek elites was not matched by political power. Ethnic 
Uzbeks enjoyed some limited, formalistic representation in local and national politics. While 
the mayor of Osh was always a Kyrgyz, one of two deputy mayors was usually an Uzbek, 
while the chairman of the city council was also usually an Uzbek. The Uzbek community 
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enjoyed some representation in the national parliament, with between five and seven 
Uzbek representatives being elected in successive parliaments between 1995 and 2005. 
They also usually maintained at least one individual in the national government at the level 
of deputy minister.32 In the 2007 parliament there were six Uzbek deputies out of 90 (6.6%), 
but in the 2010 parliament, elected after the June 2010 violence, only three Uzbek deputies 
(2.5%) out of 120 remained, reflecting the new political realities of the post-conflict period.33 
But all these figures were much lower than the proportion of Uzbeks in the national pop-
ulation.34 The situation was even worse in the civil service and the security forces. According 
to official figures, in 2009 out of 17,978 state employees, there were only 181 representatives 
of ethnic minorities.35 The local police and procuracy were dominated by ethnic Kyrgyz, 
and as Soviet-era appointments retired or left, the imbalance was worsening.36 By 2010 
there was only one Uzbek judge out of 110 judges in the 28 courts of southern Kyrgyzstan, 
and only one Uzbek investigator in the national security agency.37
The relative imbalance between the ‘holding power’ of Uzbek and Kyrgyz elites was man-
aged partly through a range of discursive and symbolic mechanisms, but primarily through 
an institution of ‘clientage’, which at its simplest involves the payment of protection money 
to a patron in exchange for commercial autonomy.38 In practice, it could involve much more 
complex exchanges, including rights to trade (licit and illicit), informal credit facilities, prop-
erty protection or financial investment. Although this system was effectively a protection 
racket, it was institutionalised and viewed by leaders in the Uzbek community as the most 
effective way to maintain property rights (in the absence of reliable courts or other formal 
institutions) and to reduce the potential for conflict. As one local deputy recalls: ‘Whenever 
a new mayor came to power, it was Uzbeks who always came to him first, they brought 
money and [said] “We won’t touch you and you don’t touch us”’.39 In other words, Uzbek 
leaders gained a certain level of protection from possible violence or problems in their 
business activities through regular payments to local formal and informal authorities; for 
many of its participants this system was seen as a useful and legitimate mechanism for 
maintaining a reproducible political settlement marked by relative inter-ethnic peace.
Under the presidency of Kurmanbek Bakiev, after 2005, these informal clientage institu-
tions came under increasing pressure. The relative political influence of the Uzbek community 
declined under the new regime, as they faced the rising aspirations of a post-Soviet gener-
ation of ethnic Kyrgyz entrepreneurs, mobilised in part by a wave of nationalist feeling. These 
represented what Michael Kalecki termed ‘intermediate class groups’ in developing countries, 
a kind of petit bourgeois proto-middle class which struggled for power in post-colonial 
regimes. These groups, which typically emerged outside formal institutions and conventional 
business, played an important role as political entrepreneurs, particularly at local level.40 In 
pluralist political systems in developing countries, such as Kyrgyzstan, political struggles 
typically comprise ‘contests between factions led and dominated by members of the inter-
mediate classes’.41 Figures from this social class played important roles in Osh, as bazaar 
owners, traders and local ‘authority’ figures, sometimes involved in semi-criminal connections 
and activities. Their emergence challenged Soviet-era elites, both urban Kyrgyz from the 
north, who had a legacy in Soviet political and government structures, and Uzbek entrepre-
neurs in the south, many of whom had developed their business and trade experience in 
Soviet economic and trade institutions.
Khan argues that ‘[t]he only viable redistributive strategy for developing country political 
entrepreneurs in the absence of any fiscal or regulatory space is to organize enough 
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organizational muscle to be able to capture resources through a combination of fiscal, 
off-budget and even illegal means’.42 They are able to do so because they have legitimacy 
and superior mobilisational and organisational power. In Kyrgyzstan these local leaders had 
significant mobilisational power, through clientage networks or kinship groups, or through 
organised crime networks. In Osh many local criminal and political leaders funded ‘sports 
clubs’, where their followers trained and congregated. Local police estimated there were 
nearly 150 such clubs in 2010, most of which were exclusively visited either by young Kyrgyz 
or young Uzbek men; they were often run by trainers with criminal records, and operated 
under the protection of ‘either political leaders or criminal groups, or some combination of 
the two’.43
A typical representative of these newly emergent ‘intermediate class groups’ in Kyrgyzstan 
was Melis Myrzakmatov, who served as mayor of Osh in 2009–2013. He graduated from Osh 
Technical University as an ‘economist-manager’, before joining the local police force and the 
tax inspectorate – typical prerequisites for a successful business career in Kyrgyzstan. In 2007 
he moved into politics, and was appointed as mayor of Osh in January 2009 by President 
Kurmanbek Bakiev. Uzbek leaders in the south were worried about his reputation as a Kyrgyz 
nationalist, and in interviews Uzbek businessmen claimed that the mayor’s team began to 
undermine the informal institutions of the post-1990 political settlement, including a rene-
gotiation of the clientage system.44 It was not merely a potential increase in costs that upset 
Uzbek entrepreneurs, but the semiotic context of these exchanges: ‘Until Melis’, argues one 
former official, ‘the authorities always did deals with the Uzbeks: and they didn’t deal with 
them arrogantly (naglo ne delali).45 Even where existing protection roofs (krysha) were not 
disbanded, they were no longer conducted in a way that accorded with the other side’s 
understanding of what was culturally appropriate. In other cases, protection was simply 
curtailed. One opponent later said: ‘Melis did not provide a roof for business. He just forced 
people out of business’.46
One of the strengths of Khan’s model of political settlements is his recognition that 
non-material factors play an important role in patronage systems. Alongside economic 
wealth, ‘[t]he political ability to organize, the numbers of people that can be mobilized, and 
perceptions of legitimacy’ all contribute to holding power.47 Myrzakmatov’s accumulation 
of economic power was inseparable from the symbolism and meaning with which these 
new elements of an emerging political economy were imbued. The assertion of political 
power against the perceived economic advantages of the Uzbek community had particular 
resonance within Myrzakmatov’s narrative of Kyrgyz nationalism. Moreover, Myrzakmatov 
marked his difference from traditional Kyrgyz elites, with a populist message that resonated 
with many young Kyrgyz. His supporters claimed that he was a new type of politician, who 
did not ‘steal from the budget’ and ‘checked the streets at 7 am every day’.48 This well-con-
structed image – achieved with the help of journalists and media advisers – contributed to 
a narrative of Myrzakmatov as a strong Kyrgyz leader who could properly represent the 
interests of the ethnic Kyrgyz population in the south, even at the expense of minority groups.
Violent conflict and dispossession
Despite these underlying shifts in power at the local level, a peaceful transition to a new 
political settlement might have been managed were it not for the collapse of central political 
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authority in April 2010, when President Bakiev was ousted from power by opposition pro-
tests in the capital, Bishkek. He was replaced by a weak interim government, which was 
unable to act as a ‘guarantor’ of the existing informal political settlement in the south, 
leaving a fluid political and economic environment in which rival groups were tempted to 
test their own holding power through the use of violence.
The first clashes broke out in May 2010 in Jalal-Abad between local Kyrgyz activists and 
followers of Kadyrjan Batyrov’s Rodina party, which had long campaigned for more rights 
for the Uzbek community. But alongside this political conflict, there was also evidence of an 
emerging struggle over economic resources that frequently mapped onto ethnic divides. 
In late April 2010, there was a confrontation between local Uzbek entrepreneurs, importing 
cars from South Korea, and a local (Kyrgyz) criminal gang demanding higher protection 
payments. The stand-off quickly developed into clashes between Uzbek and Kyrgyz youth, 
but police eventually ended the fights.49 Similar tensions also emerged in Jalal-Abad, where 
Aibek Mirsidikov – an alleged drug-trafficker with the nickname of ‘Black Aibek’ – was assas-
sinated on 7 June. According to Neil Melvin, ‘the May violence was also a confrontation 
between key Uzbek figures struggling to control local economic resources and … [figures] 
from local criminal circles whose position had advanced under Bakiev’.50
Against this backdrop of growing tensions over economic resources and political power, 
serious violence broke out in Osh in June 2010 between Kyrgyz and Uzbek groups. During 
several days of rioting and pogroms in 11–14 June, some 470 people were killed, and around 
2700 properties totally destroyed, including over 1900 in Osh city. Initial clashes involved 
violence from both sides, but as crowds of Kyrgyz rioters gained the upper hand, the violence 
turned into one-sided attacks on Uzbek communities, who lived in mahallas, compact areas 
of Uzbek settlement, sharply distinguished from the Soviet apartment blocks commonly 
occupied by ethnic Kyrgyz and other nationalities. Groups of Kyrgyz men carried out selective 
attacks, targeting Uzbek businesses and homes, while leaving those belonging to Russians, 
Kyrgyz or other nationalities unaffected.51 An ICG report concluded that ‘the mobs that 
roamed Osh were not for the most part mindlessly set on random destruction’, but ‘were 
well organised and often well supplied’.52 One rioter was quoted as saying that they were 
looting because Uzbeks had ‘started to live too wealthily’.53
Even as the violence died down, the redistribution of property began. Kyrgyz rioters stole 
properties or forced Uzbeks to sell cars at nominal prices to permit them to leave. Rioters 
attacked people physically to force them to leave the city, and took possessions from them 
as the price for safe passage.54 The overall pattern fitted Khan’s model of a conflict acting as 
‘a mechanism [to establish] a distribution of benefits that is in line with [the …] distribution 
of holding power’.55 A local official articulated this interpretation in simple terms: ‘The root 
of the Osh events was that the Uzbeks had taken control of all the business, and [then there 
was] a brutal redistribution of property [zhestkii peredel]’.56 He went on to assert that ‘A redis-
tribution of property took place. The Uzbeks left, sold their businesses, that’s a fact’.57
During a second phase of the post-conflict period (July 2010–2011) local Kyrgyz elites 
seized more businesses through the process often described using the Russian term reider-
stvo [raiding], meaning forced takeovers of business through the threat of violence or criminal 
prosecution, subsequently legitimised through formal codification of the sale. This process 
involved the semi-voluntary or forced sales of Uzbek businesses to new Kyrgyz owners. The 
extent of this process is difficult to measure, because in some cases, there was a formal 
appointment of an ethnic Kyrgyz as director of an Uzbek businesses as a form of protection. 
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One businessman explained that ‘they appointed Kyrgyz [as directors] because of the nation-
alism and so that the police did not put pressure on them’.58 A well-connected Uzbek leader 
claims that ‘after 2010 the majority of restaurants and business were reregistered to Kyrgyz’.59 
Another claimed that prior to 2010 ‘90% of restaurants were owned by Uzbeks, but by 2013 
70% were owned by Kyrgyz businesspeople’.60 In the transport sector, one entrepreneur 
claimed that of around 15 companies that he knew were managed by Uzbek businesspeople 
before 2010, only two or three remained intact.61 In theory those who lost their businesses 
in the violence were eligible for compensation, but in practice this did not always help. An 
Uzbek businessman said: ‘Many lost their business through it being burnt down or through 
reiderstvo – Kyrgyz bought up the business, and then you can’t say that it was raiding. If you 
sold the business, then you can’t apply to international organisations [for compensation]. 
People just don’t apply’.62
Many Uzbek businesspeople left Osh during this period. Thousands fled to Russia or to 
Kazakhstan. Those Uzbek businesspeople who remained in southern Kyrgyzstan recounted 
several mechanisms they used to seek new modes of protection in this challenging envi-
ronment, seeking alternative protection kryshas, doing deals with local police, gaining 
Russian citizenship or shifting the bulk of their business to Russia or to Bishkek.63 In 2010–
2011, however, there was still no new political settlement: several interviewees complained 
that during this period it was difficult to find a reliable krysha, with the police in particular 
playing a highly predatory role. There were multiple cases in which ethnic Uzbeks were 
subject to arbitrary arrest, imprisonment and torture. In such cases police typically threat-
ened to concoct prosecutions on the basis of crimes committed during the June 2010 vio-
lence unless the accused paid large sums of money for their release. In September 2011, 
interviewees reported that ransom payments of US$1000 or US$1500 were typical in such 
cases.64 Traditional practices of brokerage – whereby individuals with good connections in 
both communities could intervene on behalf of victims – appeared to no longer be func-
tioning effectively.65
In response to the conflict and its repressive aftermath, the Organization for Security and 
Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) had proposed an international police mission, which was 
designed to work with the Kyrgyz authorities to address underlying grievances and resolve 
potential triggers for future conflict. The OSCE High Commissioner on National Minorities 
Knut Vollebaek called for ‘a power-sharing agreement’ to include ‘ethnic Uzbeks and repre-
sentatives of other national minorities in all state institutions, including law enforcement 
agencies, judicial bodies and public administration at all levels’.66 Subsequently, an interna-
tional Kyrgyzstan Inquiry Commission (KIC) called for Uzbek social grievances to be addressed, 
including recognition of the status of the Uzbek language and ‘ensur[ing] that the compo-
sition of the security forces reflects the ethnic diversity of the society’.67 These international 
proposals to address minority grievances were strongly rejected by local and national author-
ities in Kyrgyzstan. Demonstrators in Osh, encouraged by Myrzakmatov, denounced what 
they termed plans for ‘another Kosovo’ in Osh, seeing international proposals as the prelude 
to inevitable Uzbek separatism.68 In the end, the OSCE’s police mission, diluted to an impotent 
advisory role in response to objections by the Kyrgyz government, failed to have any signif-
icant impact.69
Instead of agreeing to international blueprints for an inclusive post-conflict process, 
Myrzakmatov presided over a new, highly illiberal, political settlement, which sought to 
manage the conflict using coercive, authoritarian practices. An ethnic Uzbek had traditionally 
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been appointed as deputy mayor, but Myrzakmatov discontinued that practice; he also 
replaced ethnic Uzbeks with ethnic Kyrgyz officials in administrative posts in districts of 
majority Uzbek settlement.70 Myrzakmatov continued to consolidate control over business – 
according to one local businessman, the mayor informally controlled 90% of the business 
in the city by 2013.71 Although this is probably an exaggeration, another local observer 
claimed in late 2013 that ‘business in Osh without the support of the mayor is impossible’.72 
One entrepreneur argued that the city had been divided up among two or three powerful 
players, but that Melis was by far the most powerful: ‘Melis is god and tsar!’73 Myrzakmatov 
also proposed a radical new reconstruction of the city, which would have demolished many 
buildings in the city centre and replaced traditional Uzbek mahalla communities with 
multi-ethnic high-rise apartment blocks. The mayor also proposed to transfer Osh’s famous 
bazaar outside the city.74 One Uzbek leader admitted that ‘the Kyrgyz also suffered’ from 
predatory practices, but that these were legitimised by local Kyrgyz leaders, who character-
ised extortion as a means for ‘squeezing the Uzbeks’.75 This kind of ethnicization of practices 
of extortion represented a form of victory for local Kyrgyz in what was widely described 
locally as a ‘war’.
Renegotiating political settlement
Paradoxically, it was the institutionalisation of these economic practices that formed the 
basis of a new informal political settlement that began to emerge in 2012–2013. There was 
little doubt that Myrzakmatov was widely disliked by the Uzbek community. One local Uzbek 
businessman explained: ‘Melis always had difficult relations with ordinary Uzbeks […] They 
[Uzbeks] will follow anybody rather than Melis!’76 Yet during 2012–2013, Myrzakmatov began 
attempts to win over Uzbek leaders and entrepreneurs including – according to interviews 
with Uzbek businesspeople and Kyrgyz officials – providing them with new informal pro-
tection mechanisms for their businesses.77
One Uzbek businessman, Amanyllo Iminov, who was also the deputy speaker of the local 
kenesh (assembly), became an open supporter of Myrzakmatov and in 2011 even joined his 
Uluttar Birimdigi party. Several other Uzbek businessmen become publicly identified with 
the mayor in the city. This close association with the mayor certainly damaged the credibility 
of some of these Uzbek leaders with parts of their community. Yet other Uzbeks also turned 
to the mayor for support. When asked why, one local politician argued that ‘It is what we are 
used to. First we had Aidar [Akaev],78 then Koshelek [literally, in Russian, ‘wallet’, the nickname 
of a local member of parliament], then [the Bakievs], and then Melis came along’.79 In this 
way institutionalised clientage mechanisms re-emerged, with different terms and conditions 
reflecting a new reckoning of political and economic power between the two 
communities.
The structure of this new political settlement was constructed according to Khan’s model 
of an equilibrium of ‘holding power’ between the two sides. On the one hand, the conflict 
had demonstrated that the Uzbek community was much the weaker – Kyrgyz leaders could 
mobilise supporters, and had at least the tacit support of parts of the coercive state appa-
ratus. But after the conflict, the Uzbek community began to attract international support. 
The government in neighbouring Uzbekistan had not intervened in the conflict, but had 
made clear that it would not countenance further violence towards ethnic Uzbeks in 
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Kyrgyzstan. The Russian government also did not intervene, but showed sympathy towards 
the position of ethnic Uzbeks, some of whom held Russian citizenship. International financial 
institutions, such as the Asian Development Bank, funded much of the city’s reconstruction, 
and therefore also had leverage. These external pressures partially constrained the ability 
of local Kyrgyz elites to mobilise on nationalist grounds to achieve political and economic 
goals, and limited the ability of local elites to use violence to maintain political and economic 
dominance.
Second, the Uzbek community began to regain some political and economic clout. 
Scheduled elections to the local Osh council (kenesh) in 2013 reminded local Kyrgyz 
leaders of the importance of the Uzbek vote. As one former official argued: ‘He [the 
mayor] helped influential Uzbeks so that they would help him at the elections – he only 
helped Uzbeks for his own political goals’.80 Moreover, the logic of pre-existing informal 
institutions began to reassert itself. The violent redistribution of property during the 
conflict and the departure of some Uzbek entrepreneurs provided a one-time transfer 
of resources and property to local elites, but damaged the local economy. The direct 
seizure of assets had reduced the ongoing ‘clientage’ payments received by local elites, 
and therefore a new political and economic settlement was increasingly attractive for 
economic reasons.
Third, Myrzakmatov failed to achieve a fully effective authoritarian political settlement, 
demonstrating the difficulty of achieving a sub-national political settlement while in dispute 
with the central authorities. According to the model of authoritarian conflict management, 
sustainable authoritarian responses to conflict require control over a single-pyramid patron-
age system.81 But Kyrgyzstan had always been characterised by a pluralistic system of mul-
tiple pyramids of patronage.82 Myrzakmatov attempted to construct an alternative, 
monolithic subnational political system, but there were many other powerful economic 
actors in play, including at the national level. An initial attempt by the central government 
to oust Myrzakmatov in 2010 had failed, but the national government continued to constrain 
his attempts to take total control in Osh. The government used the donor-funded State 
Directorate for Reconstruction and Development of Osh and Jalalabad, headed by presiden-
tial ally Jantoro Satibaldiev, to create a parallel flow of funds into reconstruction and reha-
bilitation projects, outside the mayor’s control.83 Above all, Myrzakmatov’s influence over 
the security forces lessened sharply in 2012–2013, after the appointment of Suyun Omurzakov 
as head of the city police on 11 January 2012, and subsequently as head of a combined 
interior ministry command for Osh and the surrounding region in February 2013. Omurzakov 
was an experienced political operator, and well-known locally. ‘He’s a good fighter, daring – 
he’ll break Melis’, predicted one local businessman, in December 2013, who knew 
both men.84
And so it turned out. During 2013 the security services and interior ministry began to 
work against Myrzakmatov more openly; delegations from Bishkek arrived to check on the 
loyalty of the local police. In December 2013 a former official from the mayor’s circle said, 
‘all the law enforcement agencies are working against us! The whole Republic is working 
against the mayor’.85 Myrzakmatov stood in fresh mayoral elections (held among members 
of the city kenesh), but on 15 January 2014 Myrzakmatov lost the vote, and a new mayor, 
Aitmamat Kadyrbaev, took over.86 Myrzakmatov subsequently left the country, but was sen-
tenced to seven years in prison in absentia in July 2015 on charges of corruption and abuse 
of office. 87
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Although marked as a sharp political rupture, the dismissal of Myrzakmatov merely 
resulted in a more sustainable institutionalisation of Osh’s new political settlement. The 
informal institutions of clientage gained new patrons, but the underlying premise of the 
political settlement remained the same.88 The new local leadership developed more effective 
engagement with Uzbek community leaders, and the overt repressions and ad hoc extortions 
against Uzbek citizens of 2010–2012 were largely ended. The police force in Osh became 
much more restrained in the sphere of ethnic relations, and there was considerable effort 
to improve the city’s reputation through symbolic politics aimed at improved inter-ethnic 
relations. Beneath the surface, however, it was a renegotiated political settlement and recon-
figured informal institutions of clientage that underpinned a fragile stability in the city.
Conclusion
Political settlement theory provides a productive framework to explain the outbreak of 
violence in Osh in June 2010, and to investigate why a new post-conflict political settlement 
gradually emerged after a period of violence and repression during 2010–2012. The terms 
and mechanisms of this new settlement were radically different from those proposed by 
international actors, who advocated a traditional liberal agenda of minority rights and 
transitional justice, overseen by an international police mission. Western NGOs warned that 
a failure to address these underlying minority grievances and continuing ethnic tensions 
would result in renewed conflict, but contrary to these warnings, the political settlement 
proved rather durable. NGOs and external funders promoted programmes designed to 
improve inter-ethnic understanding, mediation and reconciliation but there was little evi-
dence that these were effective.89 Rather, the real dynamics of peace and conflict were 
located in the precarious balance of economic power between communities, managed by 
opaque and corrupt informal institutions. The new balance of economic and resource dis-
tribution was forged in communal violence, and imposed through authoritarian practices. 
But the new settlement ultimately gained stability because it reproduced long-standing 
informal institutions, primarily those of clientage and brokerage, which enjoyed a measure 
of legitimacy among both communities.
The Osh case study contributes to the wider debate about what constitutes a political 
settlement. The stabilisation of the situation in Osh did not involve a deliberate elite pact; 
there was no conscious sense of what Kelsall describes as an ‘ongoing, conflict-ending 
agreement among powerful groups’, or what Khan dubs a ‘planned settlement’.90 Instead, 
the Kyrgyz case corresponds to what Khan describes as ‘an “interactive order”, in which 
an identifiable and fairly robust social order exists, but it is the outcome of many inter-
actions between groups and not based on any agreement or pact that can be identified 
ex ante’.91 A conscious elite agreement about resolving the conflict would always have 
been difficult, since there were profoundly different understandings of the causes of the 
conflict, and no agreement on how underlying grievances should be addressed. Informal 
institutions in the political economy, however, could be renegotiated and reinvigorated 
in ways that bypassed these fundamental differences, and yet were viewed as legitimate 
in an historical and cultural context. In this way a political settlement was restored, 
although the structural violence and the grievances that it entailed remained largely 
unaddressed.92
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Second, informal institutions involving clientage payments and protection were central 
to the re-emergence of a political settlement, but they were not simply about financial pay-
offs and protection rackets. Instead, these informal institutions re-emerged and were rene-
gotiated as part of a much wider set of networked relationships within the cultural context 
of Osh, including new and revived symbolic and discursive practices, a resurgence of patterns 
of political representation and electoral support, and other informal institutions and practices 
of brokerage and mediation, which served to legitimise and manage the new political 
settlement.
Third, the form of political settlement that emerged in Kyrgyzstan was not ‘inclusive’ in the 
sense widely used in the policy literature to denote inclusivity of factions in an elite bargain.93 
On the contrary, the political settlement involved the subordination of a minority group within 
a narrow, exclusionary settlement, characterised by authoritarian practices. Instead of a new, 
horizontal elite coalition, the political settlement was formed through the forced inclusion 
of minority groups into hierarchical pyramidal structures, characterised by vertical patron–
client relations, and policed by the use of coercive, discursive and economic mechanisms. 
This type of political settlement is no longer adequately conceptualised by models based on 
inclusivity, but instead is better understood as a form of ‘authoritarian conflict management’, 
a set of authoritarian and illiberal practices that aim to control and manage violent conflict.
The Kyrgyz case should act as a cautionary note to policymakers’ increasing recourse to 
the idea of political settlements as an alternative framework for conflict resolution. Political 
settlements are almost always intertwined with different forms of violence, involve logics 
of both inclusion and exclusion, and are often hierarchical and authoritarian in their out-
comes. Consequently, it should be recognised that Khan’s political settlement theory and 
models of ‘illiberal peace’ pose a normative challenge to models of conflict resolution and 
liberal peacebuilding, threatening to legitimise violence as an inevitable, ‘natural’ mode of 
redressing power imbalances between communities, and justifying authoritarian responses 
as an acceptable means to achieve a cessation of violence.
Instead, these new analytical approaches should be used to inform more realistic and 
context-specific policies. A recognition of the messy reality of how order is often produced 
in post-conflict societies, through violence, exclusion and dispossession, is the first step 
towards more effective responses by both internal and external actors in ending civil wars. 
Conflict resolution may require alternative pathways and mechanisms to allow political 
settlements to emerge peacefully, for example through institutional reforms or new mech-
anisms for economic redistribution that address sharp imbalances between communities. 
Conflict prevention policies may seek to address issues of economic inclusion alongside 
the more traditional focus on minority political grievances. Conflict analysis needs a much 
better understanding of how informal economic institutions can help to constrain violence 
and allow viable post-conflict orders to emerge. Political settlement theory provides import-
ant insights into why many external prescriptions for resolving conflicts fail, but it can also 
offer a new appreciation of how policy responses informed by the complexities of local 
politics can encourage divided societies to move towards more peaceful and sustainable 
outcomes.
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